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Marine Scientific Research Amid
Troubled Political Waters
By THo As JoHN Sconrro
Member of the Clas of 1979.
A SUBTLE, yet critical confrontation is taking place. What it lacks
in profile, is certainly offset by its potential impact on the inter-
national community. The delegates involved in this United Nations
Conference have obscured the purpose for which they have met, and
in so doing, they have jeopardized the quest for the knowledge upon
which man will inevitably rely for future survival.
The Third Committee of the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Seas has been entrusted with safeguarding the future of
marine scientific research. Recent developments, however, have led
many to believe this function has degenerated into an offensive po-
litical battle to divide the worlds oceans into jurisdictional exten-
sions. In order to understand this political confrontation, it is essen-
tial to place it in historical perspective. This note will therefore focus
upon the emerging pattern of the negotiations and point out the po-
tenial obstacles confronting the marine scientific researcher.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two main factions involved in this critical confrontation.
The first group of advocates is the researching states, composed of
those developed states, in particular the United States, which are
actively conducting marine research.' They strongly endorse the po-
sition that there ought to be unfettered research in the world's oceans.
This is broadly interpreted by these states to mean that there should
be no restriction asserted over marine research by coastal states. The
1. SuBcoMa-r-E oN Do),msnc AND INTrNATIONAL ScmNrTIc PrLNNTc, ANAL-
Ysis AND CooPERAToN, Cosi&, n-rER ox ScmNcE AmJ TrmLOGy, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess., REvmw oF Tim THmD LAW OF T-= SEs CON ERENCE, SPECUL OvnsIcTrr RE-
PoNT, (Comm. print 1977) 10, 11 [hereinafter referred to as Tim SPEC AL OvnsicTrr
REP RT]. The nations identified as most actively advocating marine freedom were the
U.S., West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Belgium.
The Soviets supported this position until 1976.
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other group of advocates is composed of the developing coastal states
who foster the sentiment of the developing world generally.2 These
developing coastal states are fearful of the results of the uncontrolled
expansion of marine research. This fear is premised on the theories that
through such research, they would lose control over the natural re-
sources off their coasts and that the research would ultimately result
in an expanding technological gap between themselves and the de-
veloped states.
Marine research can be broadly divided into two categories: funda-
mental or pure scientific research, the investigation of the natural
phenomena in the marine environment, and resource oriented research,
the exploration and exploitation of the living and non-living resources
of the oceans. There is, of course, the inevitable overlap between the
two types of research, but as will be shown in this ,rote, the distinction
need not be blurred.
The recent trend in Law of the Seas Conferences has been to divide
the oceans into three zones: the territorial sea," the exclusive economic
zone, [hereinafter referred to as the EEZ],4 and the international
zone.
5
The territorial sea is that zone adjacent to the coast line and ex-
tending out as far as twelve nautical miles.6 Here Ihe coastal state has
sovereign rights over all activities within this zone, including the con-
ducting of marine research. 7 Of the three zones, the international zone
is that area farthest from the coast.8 The territorial sea and the inter-
national zone, however, are beyond the scope of this note.
2. Id. at p. 10.
3. See U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/L.52 (in force Sept. 19(4) [hereinafter cited as
TEvonroM SEA CONVENTION].
4. There have been several terms - the exclusive economic zone, the patrimonial
sea, the 200 mile zone, the national sea, the region under national jurisdiction and/or
sovereignty - which have been used to define that region of coastal state jurisdiction
which lies between the territorial sea and the international zone. For the purpose of
this note, this region will be referred to as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
5. See U.N. Doec. A/CONF. 62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CoMPosITS
TnxT]. Under art. 1, para, 1, the international zone is referred to as the "Area," and
is defined as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction," and under art. 135, neither the legal status of the waters super-
jacent to the Area or that of the air space above those waters is to be affected.
6. Tm ,rromiL SEA CoNvzrnroN, supra note 3, at art. 1. "[T]ho sovereignty of
a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea ad-
jacent to its coast." Left unresolved was the breadth of the territorial sea. Under the
CoMPosrrE TT=, supra note 5 at art. 3, however, "Every slate has the right to es-
tablish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles,
measured from baselines determined in accordance with the present convention."
7. ComyosrrE TE XT, supra note 5, at art. 3.
8. Id. at art. 1.
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The EEZ is that region sandwiched between the other zones and
extending beyond the territorial sea for 200 nautical miles9 - encom-
passing roughly 36% of the oceans and an area approximately equal to
the total land mass of the world.10 The concept of an EEZ is rapidly
gaining international acceptance, especially in the developing world,
although the actual rights afforded a coastal state are still undeter-
mined.11 It has been proposed that the coastal state should have sover-
eign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation and manage-
ment of natural resources, whether living or non-living within 200 miles
of its coast.'2 These rights would extend through the subsoil and seabed
of this region as well as the waters above it.'3 It is the EEZ which is
of major concern to both the researching state and the coastal state.
Since most marine phenomena readily accessible to scientific research
9. Id. at art. 57.
10. Hearings on the Law of the Seas Conference Before the Subcom. on Domestic
and International Scientific Planning, Analjsis and Cooperation of the House Comm.
on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1977) (prepared remarks) (state-
ment by Mr. Wuf, representative for Law of the Seas, National Science Foundation)
[hereinafter cited as ScmNcE Am TECHNOLOGY HEArXUNGs].
11. Set out below, is a discussion of the development of the concept of an exclu-
sive economic zone by the developing world.
In 1947, Chile and Peru proclaimed sovereignty over the adjacent waters and
underlying sea-bed out to 200 nautical miles from their coast. U.N. Doe. St/Leg. Ser.
B/i, at 6, 16 (1951). In 1950, Ecuador had taken a similar stance. In an effort to
coordinate their policies, they made a joint policy statement, the Santiago Declara-
tion, in 1952 (C.E.P.). The countries wanted to protect one specific economic func-
tion - fishing - by implementing a 200 mile limit. The wording of the declaration,
however, could be interpreted as forming a 200 mile territorial sea by its claim of
sole jurisdiction over the sea adjacent to the coast out to 200 miles. In 1966 Argentina
adopted a similar policy to C.E.P. U.N. Doe. St/Leg. Ser. B/15, at 45. In 1972,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic, Trinidad, Tobago, and Venezuela, endorsed the Santo Domingo Declaration.
This declaration proclaimed, that in a region 200 miles out from the coast, the coastal
state would have jurisdiction over resource exploitation, pollution control and scientific
research, but that maritime activities would not be affected. (See S. ODA, Lmrm A,
TIoNAL LAW OF Tim SEAs 347-49).
The developing states of Africa took a position to extend coastal state jurisdiction
at the African states' regional seminar on the Law of the Seas in Yound6 in 1972. The
participants - Cameron, Tunisia, Algeria, Dahomey, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Sene-
gal, Ethiopia, Equitorial Guinea, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Mauritis, Tanzania, and
Togo - agreed that offshore resources, out to 200 miles, would be under control of
the coastal state. The following year, the Organization of African Unity, (OAU), endorsed
the concept of a 200 mile exclusive economic zone for living resources. As shown,
the concept of an exclusive economic zone has been gaining acceptance in the devel-
oping world, although the actual rights afforded the coastal state within this region
have been uncertain.
See generally, K. Hj]ETONssON, Nmv LAW OF TnE SeAs (1973); S. ODA, Tim
INTERNAnIoNAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEvELOP.!rT (1972).
12. ComlaosrrE TEXT, supra note 5, at art. 56(1)(a); art. 57.
13. Id.
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occur within the EEZ, researching states adamantly oppose any re-
striction of such research by the coastal state.14 On the other hand, the
EEZ was designed to afford the coastal state control over the natural
resources of a set region. Developing coastal states have argued that
their rights within the EEZ also extend to all forms of marine re-
search. The basis of discussion in this note is the attempted resolution
of the coastal and research state rights and obligations concerning the
conduct of marine research within the EEZ.
The substantive issues confronting both the researching states and
the coastal states are as follows:
1. How far off its coast can the coastal state exercise jurisdiction over
the conduct of marine research [hereinafter referred to as the con-
sensual zone]?
2. Should consent be required for both forms of marine research?
3. What are the grounds for refusing consent?
4. Should settlement procedures exist to deal with disputes arising
between the coastal state and the researching state?
These issues are recurrent throughout the negotiations and pro-
posed solutions reflect an emerging pattern of obstacles to marine
scientific research. This note will first give the reader a brief chronology
of the many sessions through which these final issues have evolved.
Next, the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention which represents initial
codification of international law governing the conduct of marine
scientific research is briefly set forth. The remaining portion of this
note delves into the litany of draft proposals and negotiating texts.
II. CHRONOLOGY
In 1958, 86 nation representatives convened in Geneva, for the
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas. Their efforts
resulted in four international conventions which are still in force:
The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,15 the High Seas,1' Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas' 7 and the
Continental Shelf.' These conventions did not, however, resolve any
of the conflicting interpretations among the signatory nations as to
14. ScmNcn A TECHNOLOGY HEARINGS, supra note 10, at 6.
15. TEn romAL SEA CoNOvINox, supra note 3.
16. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/L.53 (in force Sept. 1962).
17. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/L.54 (in force March 1966).
18. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/L.55 (in force June 1964) [hereinafter cited as SiEy
COMNMON].
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the precise breadth of the territorial sea.19 As a result, two years later,
in 1960, the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Seas convened in Geneva. This conference, like its predecessor, was
also unable to settle the dispute as to the breadth of the territorial
sea.
20
In 1967, the General Assembly, in response to an initiative pro-
posed by Malta, formed an Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful
uses of the seabed and the ocean floor 2 ' beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.22 In 1968, the General Assembly replaced the Ad Hoc
Committee and established the Committee of Peaceful Uses of the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor.
On the basis of the work done by the Seabed Committee, the
General Assembly in 1970 voted that a Third Conference on the Law
of the Seas would convene in 1973. It was further resolved that the
goal of the conference would be to produce a single convention dealing
with all matters relating to the seas.2 3
The first session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Seas was held at the United Nations headquarters in New
York and dealt primarily with procedural matters. It was there de-
cided the work of the conference would be apportioned among three
main committees.24 The first committee's responsibility would encom-
pass all issues concerning the exploration and exploitation of the sea-
bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The
Second Committee's responsibility would be to determine jurisdictional
boundaries of the ocean area and to specify the rights and duties of
states in these areas. The Third Committee's responsibility would entail
those matters concerning the marine environment, marine research, and
the transfer of technology.
19. TsimrroauRi SE&. CoNvsm-ox, supra note 3, merely provided in art. 1 that
"The sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters,
to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast. . . . .
20. For a useful summary of the different attitudes of states see D. Bowrr, TnE
LA. oF TaE SEA 4-12 (1967).
21. The "sea-bed and ocean floor" is generally used as a catch-all phrase to en-
compass that area at the bottom of the oceans. The ocean floor, however, refers to
the surface layer at the ocean bottom, with the seabed being that region below the
ocean floor where matter is in a colloidal state.
22. Gen. Ass. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 15, U.N. Doe. A/6716
(1967). As a result of three session of the Ad Hoc Committee, it was recognized that the
sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction should be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes. It was further recognized that new limits would have to be set up
regarding national jurisdiction.
23. Gen. Ass. Res. 3067 XXVIIL
24. Each nation represented at the conference would be allowed representation in
each of the three committees.
No. 1]
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The second session of this conference was held in Caracas, Vene-
zuela in 1974. This second session was the first substantive session and
its efforts were directed toward hearing different draft proposals and
putting them into a useful framework for further negotiations.
The following year, the third session of the conference convened
in Geneva, with the negotiations resulting in the "S;ingle Negotiating
Text," (SNT) a three part document written by the chairman of each
of the three committees. The SNT was to be used as the basis of nego-
tiation in the next convention on the Law of the Seas.
In the spring of 1976, the fourth session of the conference convened
in New York. The work product of the fourth session, based in large
part on SNT, was the "Revised Single Negotiating Text." That summer
a fifth session of the conference met again in New York, and because of
an impasse intersessional consultations took place in February and
March of 1977.
The sixth session of the conference was held during the summer
of 1977 in New York and resulted in a new "Composite Text," replac-
ing the earlier texts of the prior two sessions.
The conference would appear to be edging closer to setting guide-
lines which would foster marine scientific research -. evidenced by the
conference chairmen's prolific abilities at producing negotiating texts.
In reality, however, the work product, culminating with the results of
the last session, has twisted the conference into a jurisdictional sea
grab. After the sixth session, the major question facing researching
states, and in particular the United States, is whether they should be
subjected to ever progressing jurisdictional expansion by the develop-
ing world while simultaneously losing the freedom to explore the
oceans of the world.
IMI. 1958 CONTINENTAL SHELF CONVENTION: A
GENESIS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEAS
Prior to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Shelf Convention], international law acknowledged
the requirement of coastal state consent for any form of marine re-
search in the territorial sea.25 In regions beyond the territorial sea any
25. Prior to 1958, there was no law addressing the requirement of coastal state
consent beyond the territorial sea. See 3 PANEL REPoRTs OF TnE U.S. ComulssoN
ON MARWE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND REsouRcEs VIII-74 (1968), which mentions
that the 1958 Shelf Convention put restrictions on the conduct of marine scientific
research unknown in international law.
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form of marine research could be conducted without the coastal state's
consent. Although the main concern of the Shelf Convention was the
codification of the degree of coastal state jurisdiction over the seabed
of the continental shelf, inherent in such a convention were provisions
addressing the degree of coastal state jurisdiction over activities, in-
cluding research, which might occur on the continental shelf.28
The coastal states' consensual zone regulation of marine research
was addressed in the Shelf Convention. It broadly defined the con-
sensual zone as extending along the continental shelf out to a depth
of 200 meters or to the point of exploitability by the coastal state.27
This consensual zone, however, did not include the waters above the
continental shelf itself.23
Several areas of controversy were of significance. One issue was
whether the need for coastal state consent would extend to any form
of marine research within the consensual zone. The Shelf Convention
stated that the researching state would need coastal state consent for
any form of marine research conducted within the consensual zone.29
However, it was provided that:
... the coastal state shall not normally withhold its consent if the
request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely
scientific research into the physical or biological characteristics of
the continental shelf (emphasis added).30
The Shelf Convention also provided for the publication of results and
for optional coastal state participation. 3' On the issue of settlement
26. SEyEI CoNvEnoN, supra note 18, at art. 2, which broadly endorses the coastal
states" exclusive rights of exploring and exploiting the continental shelf. Pursuant to
this right, art. 5, para. 8 requires consent of the coastal state for research concerning
the continental shelf and undertaken there.
27. Id. at art. 1. For further discussion on the 200-meter bathymetric contour line
test and the exploitability test for determining the extent of coastal state jurisdiction
over the continental shelf, see Finley, Realism vs. Idealism as the Key to the Deter-
mination of the Limits of National Jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf 76-79 and
Goldie, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries 44-47, in Lnmrrs To NATioNAL Jums-
DICTION OVER TBE SEA (G.T. Yates III and J.H. Young, eds. 1974). See also 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INrA'.
L. Cow?,eN 296-97, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1. [hereinafter cited as IN-
TrATroNAL LAw COMmissION 1956].
28. Since Shelf Convention, art. 1 excludes superjacent waters from the meaning
of continental shelf, any research state was still free, under the Shelf Convention, as
under prior international law, to conduct any research above the continental shelf (i.e.,
in the superfacent waters) without the consent of the coastal state.
See also M. McDoucAL & W. Bunx, Tim Punuc Onan OF = OcwAs 701,
713-15; INTERNATIoNAL LAw CoM.mssioN 1956, supra note 27, at 298.
29. SHELF CoNvErToN, supra note 18, at art. 5, para. 8.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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procedures governing disputes arising between the researching state
and the coastal state, the Shelf Convention set forth no provisions.
These issues were to become major controversies in subsequent Law
of the Seas negotiations.
There were several obvious shortcomings of the Shelf Convention.
It lacked a precise definition of the continental shelf, and the question
of what precise limits would be set for the consensual zone, was there-
fore left unanswered. This shortcoming would come to haunt many
states, especially the researching states. In the years subsequent to the
Shelf Convention, the developing world often made the restrictions
pertaining to the continental shalf synonomous with the EEZ.82 In
effect this enveloped a much greater area with those restrictions pre-
viously only applying to a limited portion of the subsoil and seabed
of the continental shelf.33
The Shelf Convention also failed to establish criteria for determin-
ing when research would be categorized as fundamental or pure scien-
tific research as opposed to resource oriented research. Further, the
statutory language - "consent shall not normally be withheld" (em-
phasis added) - avoided the issue of which party, the researching state
or the coastal state, would decide what conditions are normal. The lack
of criteria for ascertaining when marine research was to be categorized
as purely scientific, coupled with the lack of established provisions
governing when consent should normally be granted, had the effect of
placing no obligation on the coastal state to actually grant consent for
purely scientific research. The end result has been the common practice
of coastal state denial of consent to conduct purely scientific research.
This has been substantiated by a recent study indicating that roughly
half the requests made for purely scientific research by two U.S. re-
searching institutions were denied.34 Finally, this convention failed
32. See supra note 11.
33. It is interesting to nqte pursuant to the CoMPosrrE T xT, supra note 5, the
overlap in definition between EEZ and the definition of continental shelf. Under art.
76, the continental shelf "comprises of the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas
that extend beyond its territorial sea . . . to the outer edge of continental margin or
200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth oF territorial sea Is meas-
ured." Under art 56 and art. 57, the EEZ includes the sea-bed and subsoil and the
superjicent waters not extending beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Although it would appear that the continental shelf, by definition is enveloped
by the EEZ, a practical reason for defining these two regions separately, Is that coastal
state jurisdiction over the continental shelf is not limited to 200 nautical miles, whereas
the EEZ is limited to 200 nautical miles.
34. ScmNcE AND TECHNOLOGY HEAcINGS, supra note 10, at p. 5. (Statement by
Mr. John Knauss, provost for Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island).
In the past year the records of the University National Oceanographic Laboratory
[Vol. 1
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to address the issue of settlement procedures to deal with disputes
arising between the researching state and the coastal state.3 5
IV. PROGRESSION OR DIGRESSION
Changes in world politics brought new pressure to bear on the
Shelf Convention. The vague wording of the Convention provisions
invited accusations of bad faith by both researching states and de-
veloping coastal states. Having built into this international convention
such broad terms tended to confuse rather than clarify, and compound
rather than simplify the existent problems. Although the goal of an
international convention should be to eliminate conflicting interpreta-
tions that would inevitably frustrate the very reason for the convention,
the Shelf Convention, which sought to ensure marine research while
acknowledging coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf,
failed to do so.
After sixteen years, in yet a Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Seas, the substantive issues of the conduct of marine
research were again confronted. The relevant sessions of the Third
Conference - Caracas, Geneva, New York '76, and New York '77 -
provide a framework to illustrate how these issues were ultimately
resolved in favor of developing coastal states and to the detriment of
marine scientific research.
1. Caracas
For the research scientist, the Law of the Seas "Caracas Confer-
ence" climaxed with two broad achievements: the establishment of
general principles governing marine scientific research 0 and a corn-
System, which coordinates the activities of the University Oceanographic fleet, indicate
that about half of the scheduled cruises for work in waters over which other nations
claim control have had requests denied, or have had major hindrances sufficient to
prevent the cruise from taking place. At least 18 nations were involved in one way
or another in inhibiting science in this major way. . . . A few years ago the Woods
Hole Institution made a series ot studies along the continental shelf of west Africa.
The primary purpose was to begin to learn something about the geologic history of
this area and the geologic structure of the shelf. At the same time the study provided
some evidence about which shelf areas might be more likely than others to have oil
and gas resources. Two coastal States refused to allow the Woods Hole ship to work
on their continental shelf. Although the program was not a failure because of these two
refusals, the results were incomplete and interpretations more difficult. The problem
is somewhat analogous to attempting to solve and then interpret a jigsaw puzzle with
a number of missing pieces. The larger the number of missing pieces, the more diffi-
cult the task and the more likely the interpretation will be wrong, even in these areas
where the research was completed.
35. See D. Bovrr, THE LAw OF = SEA 39-43 (1967).
36. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.17 [hereinafter referred to as CAMcAs].
The general principles (pt. 1 A) are:
No. 1]
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mifiment to international and regional cooperation.87 These concepts
were embodied in a "text"88 informally adopted by the Third Com-
mittee. 39 Recurrent throughout this text were underlying commitments
to peaceful research, non-interference with the legitimate use of the
seas by other nations, use of treaties to promote scientific research 0
and the dissemination of scientific findings from marine research to
the international community. The session's efforts were also directed
toward hearing different draft proposals and putting them into a useful
framework for further negotiations.
2. Geneva: A Spirit of Compromise
The Geneva Conference of 1975 was essentially a continuation of
the Caracas negotiations. 41 At Geneva, several marine research draft
proposals were either expanded or initially submitted for debate.4 2
The following discussion will deal with these draft proposals as well
as the Single Negotiating Text which was prepared by the chairman
of the Third Committee before the end of the Geneva session.
1. States shall endeavour to promote and facilitate the development and con-
duct of marine scientific research not only for their own benefit but also for the benefit
of the international community in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
2. In the conduct of marine scientific research the following general principles
shall apply:
(a) Marine scientific research activities shall be conducted exclusively for
peaceful purposes;
(b) Such activities shall not unduly interefere with other legitimate uses
of the sea compatible with the provisions of this Convention and shall be duly respected
in the course of such uses;
(c) Such activities shall comply with regulations established in conformity
with the provisions of this Convention, for the preservation of the marine environment;
(d) ...
3. Marine scientific research activities shall not form the legal basis for any
claim whatsoever to any part of the marine environment or its resources.
37. Id.
38. This text was the work product of the 10th informal meeting from July 20 to
August 29, 1974.
39. This panel included membership from all nation states represented. Its formal
name was the Committee for Marine Environment, Research and Transfer of Tech-
nology.
40. Refers to use of bilateral and multilateral treaties. CmGAS, supra note 36, at
pt. 1 B.
41. This third session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Seas took place in the Spring of 1975.
42. A draft proposal submitted by the Soviet Union and several Eastern Bloc
countries (U.N. Doec. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.26 (1975)) was also subject of debate in
Geneva. The main thrust of this proposal was on the issue of rights afforded nations
building fixed installations within the economic zone of another nation. This issue is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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(a) Obligation Regime: A Researcher's Perspective
The U.S. expressed dissatisfaction with the norms of the 1958 Con-
tinental Shelf Convention and took a position opposing any form of
requisite consent for purely scientific research in areas beyond the
territorial sea. Evidence indicates the study of most marine phenomena
specifically occurs within the EEZ.48 The U.S. argued that legitimate
scientific interests existed in this region and that discretionary consent
might well be abused. As a solution to this problem, the U.S. submitted
international guidelines with specific criteria, which if met, would
automatically permit research to proceed without the consent of the
coastal state; hence the phrase Obligation Regime. 4" Although this
draft proposal was first submitted in 1973, it continued to be the U.S.
position in Geneva.45
The Obligation Regime called for conduct guidelines relating to
all forms of scientific research within the EEZ. The obligations which
the researching state would have to satisfy are as follows:
a) provide advance notification to the coastal state of intent to
conduct research, and give a description of the research project,
b) research must be conducted by a qualified institution, with a
view to purely scientific research,
c) the coastal state has the right to participate or be represented
in the research project directly or through an appropriate inter-
national institution of its choice,
d) data and sanples collected by the researching state must be
shared with the coastal state,
43. SCiENCE AND TcHNOLOGy HEAmN, supra note 10, at 6. (Statement by Mr.
Knauss, Provost for Marine Affairs, University of thode Island.)
"Two separate studies were made a few years ago to determine the amount of
time university research vessels spend within 200 miles of the coast of foreign nations.
The five year average for the University of Rhode Island ship, Trident, was 45% of
the total working time in the economic zone of other nations. The Woods Hole Ocean-
ographic Institute did a similar analysis and estimated that the five-year cumulative
average for their largest ships (Atlantis II, Knoor, and Chain) was 38%. These statis-
tics demonstrate the importance oceanographers attach to work in the proposed econ-
omic zone."
44. This phrase, obligation regime, first appeared in the U.S. draft proposal, A/AC.
138/SC.ll/L.44 (1973) and automatically gained acceptance in subsequent negotia-
tions. [hereinafter cited as OBLICAON RnciNtE.] However, relating generally to scien-
tific research, the U.S. draft proposed the concept (art. 1) that marine scientific re-
search should benefit the international community. It also called for (art. 5) the pro-
motion of international cooperation in the field of scientific research, and (art. 6)
provided the coastal states with sovereign rights over the "conduct of scientific research
in their territorial sea." These three articles were initially agreed upon at Caracas, part
I (A),(B).
45. See U.S. DEPT o" STA'TE, SpECaL. REPorT: U.N. LAw oF min S.A CoNm-
ENCE 6 (1975).
No. 1] MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
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e) the published results of the research must be made available to
the coastal state,
f) the coastal state should be assisted in interpreting and assessing
the data, and
g) all research should comply with the international environmental
standards.4"
The Obligation Regime provoked ire among developing coastal
states.47 Because the 1958 Shelf Convention did not even address dis-
cretionary consent criteria, developing coastal states had assumed the
power to arbitrarily decide which projects would be granted approv-
al.48 The U.S. proposal by eliminating such discretionary consent ap-
peared to be shifting the law of jurisdictional control away from the
coastal state to that of the researching state. However, the 1958 Shelf
Convention never granted those assumed powers. Therefore, it could
be argued merely because developing nations had been practicing
that which they advocated, they were entitled to no more credence
than the position endorsed in the Obligation Regime.40
(b) Exclusive Consent Regime: A Developing Coastal Statee
Perspective
In contrast to the U.S. proposal, the developing states proposal
favored the idea of increased coastal state control over marine re-
search.50 The Exclusive Consent Regime would have expanded the
consensual zone to the limits of the EEZ.51 It also would have required
consent of the coastal state for any form of research conducted there. '
Through blurring the distinction between pure scientific research and
resource oriented research, the exclusive consent proposal was able
to circumvent the obligation that consent shall be normally granted
46. OBLiGATIoN REG1m, supra note 44, at art. 7.
47. Compare U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/C.3/L.13/Rev. 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as ExcLusivE CONSENT].
48. The Shelf Convention lacked provisions governing when consent should nor-
rnally be granted. It also failed to address the issue of which party, the researching
state or coastal state, would decide what conditions are normal. See generally, SliELF
CONVENTiON, supra note 18.
49. Although the Shelf Convention did not entrust such discretion to the coastal
state, such states, as was shown by Mr. Knauss' statements, supra note 34, have been
practising that which they advocate.
50. ExcLusrVE CONSENT, supra note 47 at item 2(a). The Exclusive Consent Regime
was submitted by the delegate from Iraq who was also chairman of the "Group of 77"
of the Third Committee. His draft proposal had been agreed upon by the consensus
of the "Group of 77."
51. Id. at Item 2(a)2.
52. Id. at Item 2(b)1.
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to purely scientific research, as provided under the Shelf Convention. 8
Under the Exclusive Consent Regime, coastal states would have all
together new jurisdictional powers, namely:
The exclusive right to conduct and regulate scientific research ac-
tivities in their economic zones. (emphasis added)5'
Conceivably pure scientific research might still be permitted if a
long list of obligations were deemed by the coastal state to have been
complied with by the researcher. The obligations would have required
the researching state to supply in depth information regarding the
sponsoring institution's qualifications, the scientific staff, the vessels
and equipment to be employed. 55 In addition:
The coastal state shall have the right to supervise scientific research
activities undertaken in its economic zone and to suspend and
terminate them if that state finds that these activities are not being
carried out for the declared objective or purpose of the research
or are not being carried out in accordance with the provisions of
these articles. (emphasis added)581
And still further, the researching state would be unable to publish its
findings without the explicit consent of the coastal state.5 7
Even a superficial analysis of the Exclusive Consent Regime reveals
its restrictive effect upon marine scientific research. It extended the
consensual zone to the whole of the EEZ and it lacked provisions re-
quiring that consent be granted for purely scientific research. Were
disagreement to occur regarding the satisfaction of one or more obli-
gations, or regarding the reason why consent was not granted, no
provisions were made for dispute settlement; the ultimate decision
would be by, and naturally in favor of, the coastal state.56 Therefore
the adoption of this regime would place complete discretionary ap-
proval firmly in the hands of the coastal state.
It must be remembered that oceanic phenomenon does not respect
man-made jurisdictional barriers, and many research projects now and
in the future will have to cross several EEZ's. Under the Exclusive
Consent Regime, the researching state would have no treaty redress,
53. Under Exclusive Consent Item 2(b) no mention is made of pure scientific
research or resource oriented research. The draft only states that "scientific research
in the economic zone of a coastal state shall not be conducted without the explicit
consent of the coastal state."
54. ExcLusrv CONSENT, supra note 47 at Item 2(a).
55. Id. at Item 2(b) para. 2.
56. Id. at Item 2(b) para. 3.
57. Id. at Item 2(b) para. 2(10).
58. Absence of mechanism in Exclusive Consent Text
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should one coastal state give its consent while another withholds it.
The practical effect would be the jeopardization of accuracy and com-
pleteness of the study.
Similarly, the Exclusive Consent Regime would prohibit the pub-
lication of research findings without the express consent of the coastal
state. This would pose an insurmountable obstacle to the promotion
of scientific research for the benefit of the international community.
Furthermore, it would violate the spirit of a unanimously adopted
general principle that
[s]tate(s) shall endeavor to promote and facilitate the development
and conduct of marine scientific research not only for their own
benefit but also for the benefit of the international community."
This principle had been adopted by all participants at the prior session
in Caracas, and had not been directly challenged since. Now a gradual
erosion of even this principle has been put forward as progress under
the Exclusive Consent Regime.00
(c) Advance Notification Regime: Compromise From An Unexpected
Direction
A group of 48 landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states
introduced amendments to their Caracas draft proposal on marine
scientific research." Members of this group included those nation
states that were landlocked, or had little or no continental shelf.
In their original Caracas document which established an Advance
Notification Regime, marine scientific research was defined to exclude
any activity aimed directly at the exploitation of marine resources.02
Scientific research could proceed subsequent to:
Advance notification; description of the project; the right of the
coastal state to participate in and have access to the data; and as-
sistance, if required, to interpret the data03
All states, whether coastal or landlocked, as well as appropriate in-
ternational organizations, would have the right to conduct marine
59. CA.AcAs, supra note 36, at Sec. I(A)(1).
60. Taken from the summary record of Mr. Hamid, oral remarks on April 25 at
the 22nd meeting of the Third Committee U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/c.3/S.R.22 (1975)
at 12. Mr. Hamid, the representative from Iraq, introduced the Exclusive Consent
Regime to the Geneva Conference. In his statement, he had hoped that the Revised
Exclusive Consent Regime would prove acceptable as a satisfactory compromise based
on justice and equality.
,61. U.N. Doec. A/CONF. 62/C.3/L.19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as AvzAca No-
TI 'CATION, CARACAS].
62. ADVANcE NoTcAr7oN, CARACAs, supra note 61, at art. I.
63. Id. at art. 6.
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scientific research.6 4 Neighboring landlocked and geographically dis-
advantaged states would be given the opportunity to participate, upon
request, in the research and have access to the material.0 5
The Geneva amendment" added a provision so that where a dis-
pute arose regarding fulfillment of the researcher's obligations, either
an expert in the field of marine science to be nominated by the Di-
rector General of U.N.E.S.C.O. 6 7 or any third party could intervene.08
Where conflict persisted, the dispute was to be settled in accordance
with the arbitration provisions of the proposed Law of the Seas
Treaty.69
The Advance Notification Regime thereby fell between the Obli-
gation and Exclusive Consent Regimes. In essence, these 48 nation
states went on record as not only demanding a right to participate in
future marine scientific research but having expressed their intent to
actively participate in future treaty negotiations.7"
(d) Modified Consent Regime: Developing States Compromise
This draft proposal which was submitted in the closing weeks of
the Geneva Conference was labeled a compromise by its sponsors7 '
64. Id. at art. 2.
65. Id. at art. 7.
66. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.3/L.26 (1975) [fiereinafter cited as AnvAcE No-
TmcATnoN, GENEvA], it amended ADvANcE NoTxA s nroN, CAnAcAs, supra note 61,
art. 6.
67. 1 Oc x MANAGEmENT 178 (1973). United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conducts marine science activities through an Office
of Oceanography, housed in the Secretariat, and an Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission (IOC). The Office is concerned with stimulating and coordinating scien-
tific research and especially with providing technical assistance through fellowships and
grants. The IOC has coordinated multinational scientific expeditions which depend on
voluntary national initiatives and fundings.
68. ADvA cE NoTIFcAToN, GENEvA, supra note 66, at art. 6, para. 5.
69. Id. (Provisions for such a treaty not yet written.)
70. Oral remarks of Mr. Postma on April 25 at the 22nd meeting of the Third
Committee. In a move to discredit the Exclusive Consent Regime as not representing
the interests of the international community, the Netherlands, after introducing its
draft amendments, gave the floor to the observer from the International Council of
Scientific Union (IC.S.U.). He represented the widespread feeling among oceanog-
raphers and marine scientists that the Law of the Sea Conference must consider draft
articles which will "foster creative marine science, not erect barriers against it." And
he reiterated that "the principal victims of legal and geographical restriction would be
the developing nations." The restrictions he was referring to were those embodied in
the Exclusive Consent Regime. He concluded by stressing that this type of proposal,
instead of aiding research, would effectively cripple the efforts of many intergovern-
mental organizations, especially U.N.E.S.C.O. and F.A.O.. Ironically these organizations
were then assisting developing countries to establish their own system for scientific re-
search. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/C.3/S.R. 22 (1975) at 15.
71. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/C.3/L.29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MoDnED CON-
SENT].
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and was supported largely by advocates of the Exclusive Consent and
Advance Notification Regimes 2 In borrowing freely from the prior
regimes, the Modified Consent adherents sought to allay fears of arbi-
trary research prohibition while guaranteeing some increased control
to the coastal state.
Under the Modified Consent Regime, the first step in achieving
scientific research approval would be to supply the coastal state with
information concerning :
The nature and objectives of the project; means to be used; precise
geographical areas of the research; dates of the project; the names
of the sponsors of the research project.1 3
For these purposes marine scientific research was broadlly defined
as "any study and related experimental work conducted in the marine
environment designed to increase mankind's knowledge thereof."1 4
Determining whether the research was fundamentaP5 scientific re-
search or resource oriented research would be left to the discretion of
the coastal state. When the research was held fundamental:
The researching state would ensure the right of the coastal state
participation; to print the final results of the research project; sup-
ply samples of data and materials; if requested, assist in evalua-
tion of results; make these results available to the international
community.76
If a dispute were to arise concerning the nature of the research
proposal, whether fundamental or resource related, it would be re-
solved in a manner similar to the procedure set out in the Advance
Notification Regime.77 Under the Modified Consent Regime dispute
settlement procedures, the researching state and the coastal state would
each be given the opportunity to choose an arbitrator from a list of
marine scientific experts designated by an appropriate U.N. body. If
agreement could not be reached, a third party could be called upon
to break the deadlock. Under this compromise, unlike the Advance
Notification Regime, if the conflict persisted the coastal state would
have the right to withhold approval .7
The Modified Consent Regime attempted to achieve several major
72. The sponsors were Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Nigeria.
73. MODIFIED CoNSENT, supra note 71, at art. 7.
74. Id. at art. 1.
75. Authors of Modified Consent Regime coined this term to refer to scientiflo
research.
76. MODIFED CoNsmr, supra note 71, at art 7 (5).
77. Anv .cE NoTFcAnTON, GENEVA, supra note 67, at art. 6, (5)(a).
78. MomFIm CoNsENT, supra note 71, at art. 7 (9).
[Vol. 1
points of compromise. By strictly defining fundamental or pure
scientific research, these proponents sought to foster this scientific
activity while guaranteeing coastal state rights over resource oriented
research. To avoid the need for consent, the scientific researcher would
be required to meet obligations similar to those in the Advanced Noti-
fication 9 and Obligation Regimes.80 However, the dispute resolution
procedure would not impose binding impartial arbitration. Thus, the
mechanisms for obligation interpretation and settlement procedure
were rendered largely impotent by vesting the coastal state with the
power to sit in final judgment, over any arbitration.8'
(e) Single Text
In the final days of the Geneva session, an informal Single Text8 2
was prepared by the chairman of each committee and was labeled as
a new procedural device to aid in future law of the seas negotiations.83
The Single Text included the broad philosophical concepts of inter-
national and regional cooperation incorporated originally into the
Caracas text. 4 Although put forth as a new proposal, except for several
additions the Single Text merely duplicated the Modified Consent
Regime. Both proposals would have required the researcher to provide
the coastal state with a preliminary research proposal. The document
would necessarily include the project objective, the means to be used,
the precise geographical area, the dates of the project and the name
of the sponsoring institute.8 5 Further, the researcher would be obli-
gated to specify whether the work was to be fundamental or resource
oriented.8 6
The Single Text went beyond the Modified Consent Regime by
establishing guidelines for differentiating fundamental from scientific
research;8 7 by substituting strict guidelines for discretion it was hoped
disputes could be kept to a minimum. However, were a conflict to
arise and negotiations to break down, the dispute settlement procedure
79. DvAcE NOI-ICATION, CAnACAS, supra note 61, at art. 6.
80. OBLGATiON REGE, supra note 44, at art. 7.
81. MoDnIE CONSENT, supra note 71, at art. 7 (9).
82. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/W.P.8/Part 11, (1975) [hereinafter cited as SwcNLE
TEXT].
83. Chairman of the 3rd Committee was Mr. Yankou of Bulgaria.
84. CARA As, supra note 36, at Part I A, B.
85. SiNcLE TE-=, supra note 82, at art. 15; MODIFIED CONSENT, supra note 71, at
art. 7 (2).
86. SiNcLE TExT, supra note 82, at art. 18; MODIF D CoNsENr, supra note 71, at
art. 7 (3).
87. SnxrE TExT, supra note 82, at art. 18.
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contained in the Single Text would provide for arbitration.8 8 Under
the Modified Consent Regime, where negotiations had broken down,
final resolution would have been left to the coastal state with no such
impartial treaty safeguards 8 9
If the research fit the fundamental classification the obligations
required of the researcher were identical to those of the Modified Con-
sent Regime. 0° These obligations included the coastal state's right to
participate or be represented in the project, the right to be furnished
with the final result of the project, as well as a right to raw data and
samples of material.91 In addition, if requested, assistance would al-
so be given to the coastal state to assess the data,"" and, research re-
sults would be made automatically available through international
data centers.93 Finally, the researcher would be required to supply
the neighboring landlocked and disadvantaged states with the same
relevant opportunities and information. 94
The Single Text represented a culmination of the negotiations that
had occurred at Geneva. The previous draft proposals submitted for
debate at Geneva represented the diverse positions taken by the
various negotiating factions. The developing coastal states, through the
Exclusive Consent Regime, sought to increase their jurisdiction by re-
quiring consent of the coastal state for any form of research conducted
in the EEZ or on the continental shelf. The United States, as a leading
research state, sought to forestall such an increase in jurisdiction, by
insisting on the Obligation Regime. This would allow the researching
state, upon fulfilling a set of obligations, the right to conduct research
in the economic zone. The remaining draft proposals, the Advance
Notification and Modified Consent Regimes, sought middle ground
in response to the polarity that had formed during the negotiations.
This was achieved, by limiting the requirement for coastal states con-
sent solely to resource oriented research conducted in the EEZ or on
the continental shelf. With respect to settlement of disputes, however,
88. Id. at art. 20.
89. MODIFIED CONSENT, supra note 71, at art. 7 (9).
90. SINGLE TEXT, supra note 82, at art. 16; MoDIFum CoNsENT, supra note 71, at
art. 7 (5).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Research related to the living and non-living resources of the economic zono
and the continental shelf could only be conducted with the exclusive consent of the
coastal state. This was identical to the modified consent regime. Compare SIOLE TEXT,
supra note 82, at 15, 16 with MODIFIED CONSENT, supra note 71, at art. 7 (6).
94. SINGLE TEXT, supra note 82, at art. 20 and AvNcN NoTIFc.ATioN, GNEvA,
supra note 66, at art. 6 (5).
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both draft proposals differed as to which party would ultimately decide
the issue.
Out of the nine weeks of negotiations emerged the Single Text,
which could be viewed as a legitimate attempt to balance the interests
of those various negotiating factions. This is evidenced by attempts
to make the Single Text satisfy the researching states, by eliminating
the requirement of consent for fundamental research in the EEZ or
on the continental shelf. The issue of consent had been viewed by
these states as the major obstacle to conducting marine research. As
for the developing coastal states, the Single Text laid to rest their
fears that uncontrolled marine research would endanger their natural
resources in the EEZ. This was accomplished by requiring the consent
of the coastal state for resource oriented research in the EEZ or on the
continental shelf. Finally, on the issue of settlement of disputes, the
Single Text shifted final resolution away from both the coastal state
and researching state by requiring all disputes to be settled in accord-
ance with the convention provisions. Unfortunately it must be remem-
bered that the Single Text was not meant to be an end in itself, but
rather a spring board to further negotiations in subsequent sessions.
3. New York 1976
The fourth session of the Third United Nations Law of the Seas
Conference spanned a seven week period in the spring of 1976. Re-
flecting the negotiations, each chairman of the three main committees
prepared separate drafts while the conference president prepared yet
a fourth.95
This four part text consisting of 397 articles and eleven annexes
was known as the "Revised Single Negotiating Text" [hereinafter re-
ferred to as RSNT]. 90 That portion of the RSNT regarding marine
scientific research continued to be plagued with controversy. With
respect to either the economic zone or the continental shelf, when a
state intended to conduct research, RSNT established a list of obliga-
tions which would have to be met at least four months in advance.
The RSNT required a coastal state be given:
(a) a description of the nature and objectives of the project,
(b) the methods and vessels to be used,
95. The Revised Single Negotiating Text does not represent a negotiated or ac-
cepted text, but rather in the words of the president of the conferenc, Mr. Amergsinghe,
its purpose is "a procedural device to carry forward the process of negotiation."
96. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/W.P. 8/Rev. I/pts I-I11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
"RSNT"]. Text on settlement of disputes is U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62AW.P. 4/Rev. 1.
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(c) the precise geographical area involved,
(d) dates of the project,
(e) name of the sponsoring institute, and
(f) the right to participate and be represented in the project."'
After these obligations had been met by the researching state, the
consent of the coastal state would still be required under the RSNT. 8
By comparison, the Single Text drew a distinction between fundamen-
tal research and resource oriented research,99 with only the latter type
requiring the consent of the coastal state.100 Also, RSNT reflected a
shifting away from that distinction, but stated that consent could not
be withheld unless the project:
(a) bore substantially on the exploration and exploitation of living
and nonliving resources,
(b) involved drilling or the use of explosives,
(c) unduly interfered with economic activities performed by the
coastal states, or
(d) utilized artificial islands or other structures.10'
The significance of this provision of the RSNT lies not only in the
blurring of the distinction between resources and fundamental scienti-
fic research, but also in its provisions for refusing consent. 10 2 These
grounds for denial were so vaguely worded that they could give rise
to contradicting interpretations and accusations of bad faith. For in-
stance, it would be conceivable that almost any type of purely scientific
research activity could be unjustifiably construed as unduly interfering
with the coastal states resource exploration and exploitation activities.
This would result in the preclusion of the research project. Ironically,
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention granted protection to scientific
research projects from the interference of economic activities of the
97. Id. at art. 58.
98. Id. at art. 60 (I).
99. Fundamental research was defined (SiNGLE TExT, art. 1) as the investigation
of the natural phenomena in the marine environment. Resource oriented research was
defined (SINGr.E TXT, art. 18) as that bearing directly on the exploration and exploit-
ation of the resources of the continental shelf or the economic zone.
100. SiNGrE TEXT, supra note 82, at art. 18 (I).
101. RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 60 (2).
102. Pursuant to SHELF CoNVENm oN, supra note 18, at art. 5, para. 8, consent of
the coastal state would be needed for any research on the continental shelf to a depth
of 200 meters or limits of exploitability. But that only resource oriented research would
justify denial of consent. The SiNcLE TEXr, mpra note 82, at art. 15 expanded the
consensual region to include the continental shelf and the economic zone, but limited
the requirement of consent for only resource oriented research. RSNT also extended
consensual region to include the continental shelf and economic zone, but required
consent for any form of marine scientific research.
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coastal state. 0 3 It can be argued that the RSNT, by shifting broad
discretion to the coastal state, would therefore place the researching
state in a highly inequitable position.
If the researcher had not received coastal state response within
four months of the application date, he would be free to proceed.Y04
However, within two months of the application date, the coastal state
could notify the researcher that:
(a) information regarding the nature or objectives of the research
project is inaccurate or
(b) a request for supplementary information relevant to determin-
ing more precisely the nature and objectives of the research
project is needed. 0 5
The application of these two provisions could effectively forestall
commencement of the project indefinitely.
Where the four month period had passed without coastal state
reply, and research had begun, the RSNT would still grant the coastal
state a right to terminate ongoing research. This right could be invoked
when:
(a) the researcher state failed to comply substantially with the
provisions concerning researcher obligations, or
(b) the information communicated to the coastal state was ...
shown to be inaccurate.108
Certainly the coastal states should be afforded redress if the researcher
fails to substantially comply with the obligations of the convention
but it can be argued that pursuant to section (b) of this provision,
even a coastal state who had ignored the researcher's request for
consent, could disrupt that on-going research project. These broadly
written provisions would thus permit the coastal state to revoke im-
plied'07 or actual consent.
Regarding disputes pursuant to the conduct of scientific research,
the RSNT provided for compulsory settlement procedures.103 How-
ever, this unexpected concession to researching states could not offset
the relative imbalance of the rest of the text. This imbalance was
evidenced by the fact that the RSNT blurred the distinction between
resource and fundamental scientific research that had been established
103. SHEL CONVENTION, supra note 18, at art. 5(1).
104. RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 64.
105. Id.
106: Id. at art. 65.
107. Implied consent means that consent pursuant to RSNT, art. 64.
108. RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 76.
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by the Single Text, a year prior. It also expanded the grounds for re-
fusing consent, which under the Single Text had been limited to
resource oriented research. And finally, through broadly written pro-
visions, the RSNT would have permitted the coastal state to revoke
implied consent.
4. New York 1977
The sixth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Seas was held during the summer of 1977 in New York.
The result of this session is the Informal Composite Negotiating Text,100
[hereinafter referred to as the Composite Text] which replaced the
earlier texts utilized by the prior two sessions. Its importance lies in
the fact that the Composite Text reflects the current status of these
ongoing negotiations concerning the conduct of marine research.
On the issue of researcher obligations, the Composite Text en-
dorses the proposition, as set forth in the RSNT, n 0 that if the research-
ing state intends to conduct research in the EEZ or on the continental
shelf, it will have to meet certain obligations. These obligations range
from a full description of the nature of the research project objectives
and methods, to the precise geographical description of the operations
area.""1 The Shelf Convention had not even addressed this issue, al-
though it seems to be one of the few areas that the researching states
and the developing coastal states are not in disagreement." 2
Regarding the consensual zone, for marine research, the Composite
Text states that:
[c]oastal states, in the exercise of their jurisdiction have the right
to regulate, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in
their exclusive economic zone and on their continental shelf ...
(emphasis added) 1 3
It must be remembered that this is a significant change from the Shelf
Convention which limited the coastal states consensual zone to only
a portion of the continental shelf, thereby leaving the remainder of
the continental shelf and the waters above it unrestricted.114
109. CowposrE TEXT, supra note 5.
110. RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 58.
111. Composrrm TE, supra note 5, at art. 249.
112. THlE SPECLI OvERsicm'r REPoT, supra note 1, at 11.
113. Comosrrm Tsxr, supra note 5, at art. 247(1),(2). Also note the similarity
to EXCLUSIVE CONSENT, supra note 47, at Item 2(a).
114. See text accompanying note 13, supra.
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Concerning coastal state consent, the Composite Text provides that
the consent of the coastal state will be required for any form of marine
research conducted in the EEZ and the continental shelf. There is a
further provision, however, that coastal states
[should] in normal circumstances grant their consent for marine
research projects ... if ... carried out ... for peaceful pur-
poses and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine
environment." 5
Notwithstanding the above provision, the coastal state could withhold
its consent if the research project dealt with
(a) the exploration and exploitation of natural resources,
(b) drilling into the continental shelf,
(c) construction or operation of artificial islands, or
(d) (if) the information regarding the nature and objective of the
project is inaccurate or if the research has outstanding obliga-
tion to coastal states for prior research projects."10
Pursuant to the Composite Text, it is possible that even purely scientific
research projects would be denied consent where provisions (b) (c)
and (d), non-existent under the Shelf Convention, can be applied.
To fully comprehend the impact of the Composite Text provisions
on consent for research in the consensual zone, its guideline criteria
must be read in conjunction with the procedure for dispute settlement.
The text broadly endorses the concept that disputes as to the applica-
tion or interpretation of provisions dealing with marine scientific re-
search should be handled in accordance with the settlement of dispute
provisions of the treaty. Overshadowing the general rule is the ex-
ception:
that the coastal state shall not be obliged to submit to such settle-
ment any dispute arising out of ... the exercise by the coastal
state of a right or discretion in accordance with [the consent pro-
visions of the Composite Text]."--
So in effect, disputes over the refusal of consent by the coastal state
would not be subject to any settlement or arbitration procedure, there-
by successfully precluding a researcher from any treaty recourse.
The Composite Text, in an attempt to eliminate the Shelf Con-
vention problem created by the coastal states' tendency to ignore re-
115. CoImposrrm TEXT, supra note 5, at art. 147(3).
116. Co.rmosrrE TEXT, supra note 5, at art. 247, para. 4, subsection (d) not Included
in RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 60.
117. Co .wosrm TXT, supra note 5, at art. 265.
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searching requests, provides for an implied consent provision.' 8 Under
the Composite Text, if the obligations were met, the researching state
could proceed with its project if the coastal state has not responded
to the request within six months."19 Also, the Composite Text has an
exception provision whereby the coastal state, within four months of
receipt of the researcher's request, can require further information prior
to the granting of consent.120 The effectiveness of the composite text
implied consent provision was negated by its postuire on cessation of
research and settlement of disputes. Hypothetically, where the re-
searcher had satisfied all the composite text provisions and the six
month deadline had lapsed without coastal state response, the project
could be commenced yet still subject to coastal state termination at
any time. 2 1 This right to terminate can be evoked upon a mere finding
that:
the research . . . is not being conducted in accordance with
information initially communicated to the coastal state . . . re-
garding the nature, objectives, method, means or geographical
areas ... 122
Determination of whether or not research is being conducted precisely
according to plan might not normally be the subject of abuse, but
invite manipulation where coastal state ulterior motives are present
in conjunction with this imprecise drafting.
The Composite Text radically departs from the :RSNT on the issue
of whether the coastal state shall be required to submit to settlement
procedures for any dispute arising from its cessation of a research pro-
ject. The Composite Text states:
[T]he coastal state shall not be obliged to submit to such settle-
ment any dispute arising out of . . . [t]he decision by the coastal
state to terminate a research project in accordance with . . .
[cessation of research].123
It is therefore evident that the thrust of the implied consent pro-
vision is effectively diminished by allowing the coastal state, pursuant
to a vaguely written provision, to terminate a research project without
affording the researcher any protection through compulsory settlement
of dispute proceedings.
118. SHELF CoNVENTON, supra note 18, did not address thfs issue.
119. Co~wosrrE TEXT, supra note 5, at art. 253. RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 64
provides four months.
120. RSNT, supra note 96, at art. 64 provides two months.
121. CowosrrE TEXT, supra note 5, at art. 265.
122. Id. at art. 254.
123. Id. at art. 265.
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5. Progress to Date
To fully valuate the Composite Text as the culmination of past
treaty negotiations, it is useful to compare it with the 1958 Continental
Shelf Convention. If the Composite Text were allowed to become in-
ternational law, the researching state would be required to receive
coastal state consent for any form of marine research conducted within
the EEZ (200 mile zone) or on the entire continental shelf. Under the
Shelf Convention, the consensual zone was limited to just a portion of
the continental shelf while none of the above waters were affected.
Now, although the requirement of coastal state consent for any form
of marine research does not represent a change from the Shelf Con-
vention, there will be a sizeable expansion of the consensual zone.
It is useful to see how the Composite Text addressed the short-
comings which had plagued the Shelf Convention and caused research-
ing states much concern. The Shelf Convention avoided a precise defi-
nition of the continental shelf and in doing so, a precise limit of the
consensual zone. The Composite Text, on the other hand, did set
precise limits, but in doing so also expanded the consensual zone to
200 miles off the coast.
Under the Shelf Convention, the lack of criteria for ascertain-
ing when marine research would be categorized as purely scientific,
coupled with the lack of established provisions governing when con-
sent should normally be granted, had the effect of placing no obliga-
tion on the part of the coastal state to actually grant consent for purely
scientific research. Although the Composite Text does not provide a
specific definition of pure scientific research, it does provide that:
[T]he coastal states shall establish rules and procedures ensuring
that such consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably.22'
It would appear that the lack of provision for when consent should
normally be granted, under the Shelf Convention, has been alleviated.
It could be argued, however, that the establishment of a totally dis-
cretionary procedure will be subject to abuse. With no input from the
international community or from researching states, the Composite
Text allows the coastal states to freely establish any procedure they
individually desire. Once again, the end result is a failure to obligate
the coastal state to grant consent for purely scientific research within
the consensual zone. The problem inherent in this weak statute could
be mitigated by providing a precise definition of marine scientific re-
124. Id. at art. 247.
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search and further providing that for a researching project meeting the
criteria no consent would be required.
Finally, the Shelf Convention failed to address the issue of settle-
ment procedures for disputes arising between the researching state
and the coastal state. It would appear that the Composite Text had
eliminated this problem by its broad endorsement of compulsory settle-
ment of dispute provisions. Offsetting this general rule, however, are
the exceptions. Disputes arising from the refusal of consent or cessation
of research are not subject to compulsory settlement procedures.
If the Composite Text is representative of all negotiation progress
to date, perhaps the entire United States endeavor should be reevalu-
ated prior to the next session. Inflated hopes for a viable international
agreement should not be permitted to forestall a realistic evaluation of
the trend away from mutual concession. It is difficult to conceive as
progress an expanded consensual zone with its inherent obstacles to
research. Similarly it is difficult to envision as progress the codification
of a new treaty which merely perpetuates the shortcomings of prior
outdated law. Certainly under the Composite Text, all nations whether
developed or developing would be adversely affected by this curtail-
ment or preclusion of marine scientific research.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, during the negotiations toward a convention of the
Law of the Seas, the future of marine scientific research has been
placed in jeopardy. Although efforts at reaching a compromise between
the interests of the marine researcher and that of the developing coastal
state appeared possible at the Geneva session, the results of the sub-
sequent sessions laid to rest this hope. The position endorsed by the
composite text, the work of the latest session, clearly favors extended
coastal state jurisdiction at the expense of marine science. For this
reason, there are serious reservations as to whether the rights of the
marine researcher can ever be protected under a law of the seas
convention.
There does exist a legitimate interest among developing coastal
states which must be considered. There also exists, however, a greater
need to further future marine research, as vast portions of the oceans
are still considered unknown; man has grasped only a peripheral under-
standing of the oceanic system. If the position endorsed by the Com-
posite Text is allowed to become a reality, marine scientific research
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will be seriously hampered, if not effectively eliminated. Given the
trend away from a viable researcher-coastal state compromise, perhaps
major researching states should re-evaluate whether their participation
in these now routine conferences is worthwhile.

